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Abstract
The paper aims at drawing a comparison between the reactions to the recent ¯nancial crisis by the European Central
Bank and by the Federal Reserve. Though the tools used have been largely the same, the quality and quantity of
the interventions has been very di®erent depending on the di®erent structure of ¯nancial markets in the two areas.
In particular, the ECB has not replaced private markets that did not work any more as the Federal Reserve did.
The policy design behind those interventions is di®erent too. The Federal Reserve through the quantitative easing
policy aims at lowering both short term and long term interest rates and has recently stated that this policy may
continue in the future. The European Central Bank does not justify in this way its own interventions in the market
and apparently seems not have given up its traditional goal, ¯ghting in°ation. The evolution of ¯nancial markets
both in the U.S and in Europe after the crisis re°ect di®erent initial conditions and expectations for the future. Thus
many di®erences in the structure of markets and in policy design exist. This, however, will not save Europe from
the consequences of future disorders in the Us markets. The crisis spread to Europe largely because of the global
dimension of the inter-bank market. Given that the interconnections between European and US banks have survived
the ¯nancial crisis, nothing ensures that the same thing will not happen again.
Domenica Tropeano, Universitµ a degli Studi di Macerata.
E-mail: tropeano@unimc.it.Introduction
The ¯nancial crisis of 2007-08 has caused the melting down of the ¯nancial markets over the world.
Globalization jointly with increased inter-connectedness among ¯nancial institutions in di®erent
countries has caused a real freezing of many transactions on ¯nancial markets. The global aspect
of the last crisis is what distinguishes it from other previous episodes of ¯nancial crises and also
from other recent world's ¯nancial crises such as the Asian crisis. The policy response to the crisis
has also been quite similar in the euro area and in the United States with di®erences arising from
the respective legislative backgrounds. The striking point is that all the most important central
banks seemed to be unaware of the dangers of the increasing volume of transactions in ¯nancial
markets and of the complicated web of mutual relations among ¯nancial institutions all over the
world for a long time after the crisis started in the United States in August 2007. The Federal
Reserve started with a modest lowering of the interest rate which was followed by many rounds of
further falls but it did not realize the gravity of the problem until the half of 2008, when it started
using less conventional tools and acting, rather than as a lender of last resort, as a market maker of
last resort. The ECB's awareness of the global dimensions and gravity of the crisis was even scarcer,
since in the middle of the ¯nancial turmoil, it decided to raise the interest rate, which was already
higher than the Federal Reserve's rate, by 0.25 base points. In the following months, however, the
ECB aligned its policy to that of the other central banks by lowering policy rates and starting a
programme of acquisitions of troubled ¯nancial assets form the markets. This programme has been
intensi¯ed in the last year because of the di±culties that European banks had in the light of the crisis
of some European countries' government debts. Thus the ECB`s role of market maker of last resort
has been strengthened in the last year through the covered bond programme and asset purchase
programme. The main bene¯ciaries of this intervention have been commercial banks, which had
bad quality assets on their balance sheets. For example Irish and Spanish banks, su®ering from the
consequences of real estate bubbles in their countries, largely used this facility.
At the moment of writing, both the Federal Reserve and the ECB are unwinding the extraordinary
emergency measures taken during the crisis by closing the special facilities that have been created
to address the problems of liquidity and lack of con¯dence in counterparties in the markets. The
unwinding of these measures will have consequences on market volumes and rates, which are di®erent
according to the situations faced in each country by ¯nancial intermediaries.
The late recognition of the gravity of the crisis by central banks has allowed the repercussions on
the real sector to be enormous. However, the introduction of facilities, tailored to the market, in the
last two years has helped markets to work again. This apparent success notwithstanding, monetary
policy is now laying in a sort of standstill situation. It can do nothing more than it has already
achieved and, according to the evolution of the macroeconomic variables, it might even make things
worse. In all countries we are in what is labelled as a liquidity trap situations. The monetary policy
objective of normalizing markets and make them return to do their jobs has partially been reached
albeit at the cost of severe ¯scal expenses but there are very weak signs of economic recovery and
the world risks to fall in a situation of abundant money, high unemployment and falling incomes.
In the United States the main ¯scal expenses have been directed towards the rescue of big ¯nancial
institutions and thus the stimulus to the real economy has been weak, producing weak recovery
signs. In Europe, after a wave of countercyclical ¯scal expansions in some countries, heavy ¯scal
contractions in many countries jeopardizes any hope of recovery in incomes and production.
The paper is organized as follows. In the ¯rst section there is a review of the evolution of the crisis
in the United States and of the Federal Reserve's measures to contrast it, up to the present situation.
The second section deals with the ECB's response to the crisis, distinguishing among three main
phases, non recognition of the problem, alignment to interest cuts and ¯nally direct interventions
into the markets. The third section and the fourth sections will evaluate the achievements of these
policies up to now in the U.S.A. and in Europe respectively. Conclusions will follow.
11 The Federal Reserve's policy response to the crisis.
The crisis started in the August 2007 in the United States and the ¯rst sign was a slight increase in
the rate of delinquent mortgages. In a way apparently not very reasonable this very small disturbance
created a disruption in a market whose value was in¯nitely greater (see Dodd 2007). The way the
crisis spread itself to all markets was through the linkages among ¯nancial intermediaries balance
sheets. In particular even markets for assets that were considered as totally safe, such as commercial
paper issued by ¯rms for their short term ¯nancing needs, were a®ected. The reason behind this
rapid spreading was that the intermediaries in the commercial paper market were having on their
balance sheets other assets linked to the mortgage market. The failure of mortgage purchasers to
honour their debt would have a®ected the value of the assets resulting from the securitization of
mortgages. Intermediaries, which were poorly capitalized and under-regulated, were the dealers in
this very important segment of the market. The sudden awareness of counterparty risk that arose
in the market meant that their assets found no purchasers. Because they had no other means of
¯nancing than that, they were compelled to give up their function of market makers. They had no
right to central bank re¯nancing. After this ¯rst episode the Federal Reserve continued to lower
interest rates but it seemed unaware of the fact that lowering the rates did not solve the liquidity
problems of the ¯nancial institutions that used to ¯nance themselves on the market. The liquidity
o®ered °owed to banks that, however, would not lend it to other ¯nancial institutions but rather
keep it on their balance sheets as idle or excess reserves. At some point the monetary authorities
realized that they had to allow many ¯nancial institutions which were not eligible to re¯nancing to
access credit facilities and that they could mobilize excess reserves by ordinary banks o®ering an
interest on reserves held at the central banks.
Since the money injected into the market through the normal channel, banks re¯nancing, did
not reach the parts of the ¯nancial system where it was badly needed the authorities changed the
rules by allowing non ¯nancial institutions to be re¯nanced by the central bank. At the same
time they introduced a form of remuneration previously absent for deposits held by banks at the
central bank. So they were collecting the excess reserves idle in banks' balance sheets and through
various facilities they were lending to non bank ¯nancial institutions. The turmoil in the commercial
paper market subsided for almost one year and a new episode of severe strain in that market was
registered only after the Failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. Despite the freezing in
the inter-bank market nothing more happened in the year before the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy
which triggered a new wave of disruption, falling assets price, and the like. The reason for that
slow pace of the spreading of the ¯nancial crisis is not evident by merely looking at statistics. It
has been reconstructed in a very stimulating way in a narrative paper by Ferguson and Johnson
(2009). In the whole year between September 2007 and September 2008 the Federal Reserve jointly
with other private ¯nancial institutions participated in the so-called shadow bailout. Paulson, the
Treasury Secretary in the Bush government, fearing the presidential elections scheduled to happen
in November 2008, tried desperately to avoid the spreading of the crisis postponing it to the after
election period. In this desperate attempt he used his political in°uence at the margin of law to
make many institutions participate in hidden and obscure rescue packages. Particular is the role
played by government sponsored institutions, namely the giant Fannie and Freddie previously public
¯nancial institutions operating in the private mortgage markets. They bought an enormous amount
of mortgages that nobody wanted to buy (see Ferguson and Johnson 2009). In particular they were
authorized to buy riskier mortgages. In March 2008 there was the rescue of Bear Sterns organized by
Paulson and Bernanke (respectively Treasury Secretary and Chairman of the Federal Reserve). J.P.
Morgan bought Bear Sterns. Before this happened, the New York Fed took over 30 $ billion of bad
assets in Bear's portfolio for its own account. The transaction was intermediated by a corporation
to which the Fed loaned 30 billion. Paulson had a role in the transaction in so far as it wrote
a letter allowing that the NY Fed's losses could be deducted from what annually the Fed remits
to the Treasury. The losses would thus become a burden of the Us taxpayer. Then J.P.Morgan
Chase bought Bear and saved a lot of money which would have lost if Bear had declared bankruptcy
(see Ferguson and Johnson, 2009, p.19-20). Later on, the government took over the two giant
intermediaries in the mortgages market whose assets were 40% of the US GDP . It also promised to
2purchase mortgage securities from them, which was forbidden by the law. As a consequence of this,
the government opened short term credit lines for both of them at the New York Fed. In September
2008 Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy and was not rescued while Aig, the giant insurance
company, was. The rescue of Aig meant that the government actually paid all the money that Aig
should pay to other big counterparties like Goldman Sachs for betting by means of CDS. After the
shadow bailout failed and the inter bank market was still frozen, the Fed started its special facilities
programme, which meant that, as Johnson and Ferguson write, it was no more supporting private
markets but replacing them (Johnson and Ferguson, 2009, p.41). It took all this time for the Fed
to understand that the inter-bank market or better the market for fund exchanges among ¯nancial
institutions was no more governed by the federal funds rate. Now many studies have reported what
happened, there were extensively runs on commercial paper, on the repo and on the money market
mutual funds markets (see Gorton 2008, 2009, Kacperczyk and Schnabl 2010). The \haircut", the
borrowing rate on repurchase agreements, skyrocketed in the period 2007-2009. The markets for
some credit derivatives, which were used as collateral in the repo market practically ceased to exist
(see Gorton and Metrik 2010). The Fed seemed not to have realized that a liquidity problem to these
markets might have destroyed the whole payments system. Though its interventions into the markets
have been successful in so far as they have replaced markets that had suddenly disappeared, no much
e®ort has been made to avoid that the same disgraceful situation may repeat itself in the future. The
measures taken by both the Fed and the Treasury have been shaped as emergency measures, which
had to be temporary. Most of the special facilities have already expired and the unwinding of these
emergency measures is depicted as successful. The insight that, if all these emergency measures
were necessary, the ¯nancial system architecture in itself may have been °awed, has not yet arisen
in o±cial institutions' declarations neither the question has been tackled in the recently approved
new law on the ¯nancial system.
Minsky had repeatedly written in his work that in a system with a large non bank ¯nancial
institutions sector the central bank is no more able to control the money market. Securitization in
turn adds further di±culties to the central bank's action (see Minsky 1982, Minsky 2008, Tropeano
2010a).
The market for securitization has almost ceased to exist since 2007. Most of the new securitiza-
tions are in reality re-securitizations of products that were previously rated AAA and the half of the
new issue of securitized products has been made through the Talf, the term auction liquidity facility
(IMF, 2010). The danger arises that when banks and other institutions will try to roll over existing
securitized products, either they will not succeed or they will succeed but only at increasing costs.
In turn this will raise the cost of ¯nancing for small and medium enterprises (see Imf 2010). In
the opinion of the writer, the only possible solution is that the Federal Reserve intervenes again in
the market and purchases massive amounts of these securities. In the last year the Fed has already
bought a large quantity of asset backed securities. The possibility of further interventions in this
direction, with the Fed continuing to use non conventional tools, has not been excluded by Bernanke
(2010).
Also Krugman, in a recent contribution on the NYT, has stressed that in order to avoid that the
current situation triggers a double dip recession, the Fed should purchase other risky assets even if
this means to increase the risks it bears on its balance sheets.He advocates also a role for a more
expansionary ¯scal policy and strongly opposes the so-called de¯cit hawks. In his previous work on
the liquidity trap and the ¯nancial crisis in Japan (see Tropeano 2010b) he seems to share the same
ideas that Bernanke has expressed on how to get out of a liquidity trap. Essentially, in order to
avoid de°ation, the central bank has to make people believe that it is targeting a reasonably high
level of in°ation. Bernanke (2010) agrees that one of the tools still at disposal by the central bank
is precisely to create in°ation expectation.
The market for derivatives instead has never ceased to work and some of the most dangerous
products from the viewpoint of systemic instability, such as credit default swaps, have even expe-
rienced an increase in the volume of issues and in the liquidity of the market. Some scholars even
recommend their use in their proposal for reform of the ¯nancial regulation. They argue that, since
the reform of regulation must be market-based, the cds are the ideal tool to evaluate how risky
¯nancial institutions are (see Hart and Zingales 2010).
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mutual funds still receive a lot of money as a sort of deposits. The awareness that, as Gorton and
Metrick (2010) argue, shadow banking is e®ectively banking, has not inspired any revision of their
role by the authors of the recently passed law on ¯nancial reform. Even now Paul Volcker, when
asked in an interview why the money market mutual funds are not eligible to central bank re¯nancing
in the ¯nancial reform law that has been approved by the US Parliament, seems not to grasp the
problem at all (see Levy Economics Institute 2010).
To summarize, the Fed did not understand the structural problems that had accumulated in the U
S ¯nancial system before the crisis erupted and those structural problems are still present. Chairman
Bernanke has theorized and implemented a quantitative easing policy mainly consisting of massive
injections of liquidity into the system through both usual and unusual tools. Being now aware that
the macroeconomic problems linked to the ¯nancial crisis have not been solved, he is planning to
use more doses of the same remedies. Thus, presumably, the short run interest rate will be kept
near zero for a longer time than previously thought and eventually the large scale asset purchase
programme will be continued to lower further the long-term interest rates.
2 The ECB's response.
The ECB's response to the crisis, apart from the initial mistake of raising interest rates, was similar
to that of the Fed. The ECB, however, did not intervene in the rescue of failing big ¯nancial
institutions, contrary to what the Federal Reserve has been doing during the \shadow bailout"
period. The recapitalizations of banks have been performed instead by the governments of the
countries where the banks were located. The ECB has injected in the system a lot of liquidity and
issued guarantees for private bonds. Some of these measures are being withdrawn. The liquidity
given to banks a year ago, for example, has been returned back at the maturity without big problems.
The European Central Bank has not used facilities aimed at particular markets because of the
di®erent structure of European markets with respect to those in the U S. For example, given that
money market mutual funds are not so important in the European ¯nancial structure, there has
been no run on them. The crisis has not caused a contraction in the volume of transactions in the
commercial paper market either given its scarce weight for the ¯nancing of enterprises in Europe.
The run on repo instead may have passed the ocean because it has been one of underlying causes
of the freezing of the inter-bank market. The rise in the haircuts and the margins for derivatives
transactions have surely hit European ¯nancial institutions. The problem was aggravated by the
foreign exchange denominations of all these securities. It is noteworthy that, though the crisis
developed in the US, the dollar has been appreciating throughout the year 2008. All the payments
linked to the repurchase agreements and derivatives, whose underlying assets were denominated in
dollars, had to be made in dollars. Though the European banks could access liquidity by the ECB,
the euro funds had to be swapped into dollars, which needed willing counterparties and a liquid
foreign exchange swap market (see Pozsar Z. et al. 2010 p.33). The problem was eased by the swap
operations between the Fed and the ECB. Though the European banks had in their portfolio many
toxic assets, those assets however were issued and sold by foreign counterparties. The complex piling
of markets and intermediaries' interconnections that triggered the di®usion of the crisis in the United
States was not present in Europe. In particular, securitization has been more limited in amount in
Europe with respect to the United States as it is shown in the charts below:
The transmission of the crisis in Europe was rather linked to cross-border transactions and
¯nancial globalization. Though the toxic assets were not generated in Europe and in Europe as a
whole there has not been a real estate boom leading to a bubble, all of these products, which were
the byproduct of excessive lending in the housing market in the US, passed to the other side of the
ocean. In this environment, the task of the central bank was simply to restore the working of the
inter-bank market rather than to replace the private ¯nancial markets.
The only relevant intervention in the private markets made by the ECB has been in the market
for covered bonds. Covered bonds are bonds secured by a pool of cover assets on the issuer's balance
sheet. Cover assets consist mainly of mortgage loans and public bonds, assets which are considered
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as safe. Covered bonds, in contrast to asset-backed securities, are claims of the bond holders against
the monetary and ¯nancial institutions that have issued them. About 30% of all debt securities
issued by monetary and ¯nancial institutions in the euro area are covered bonds (see ECB, 2007).
Since July 2009, the ECB has been purchasing covered bonds for a total amount of 60 trillion euro.
Recently, the ECB has launched another facility, the Securities Markets Program, which allowed
the bank to buy not only private securities but also public bonds. The total amount of securities
purchased up to now under the two programs is 100 billion euro.
Given the di®erent weight that in Europe banks have with respect to non bank ¯nancial institu-
tions, the main problem that now Europe is facing is linked to the conditions in the markets when,
and this will happen very soon, these banks will have to re¯nance huge amounts of maturing bonds.
Since most banks still have government guarantees on their bonds and the situations of governments
is not terribly healthy, the risk premia for holding both banks' and governments' debts of certain
countries may well increase.
Purchases of public bonds by the ECB have been implemented because of the di±culties of
some weak members of the European Union. They were not part of a deliberate strategy to lower
long term interest rates as it has been in the US. This would not work in the same way as in the
US in any case. In the European Union there are many public debts belonging to di®erent states
but denominated in the same currency. The action by the central bank is aiming at lowering the
interest rates on the debts of the states that have been attacked by speculation. Those countries
were compelled to pay very high interest rates on new debt issued because of the increase in risk
premia. Ultimately, the aim of the central bank may be to reduce the interest di®erential between
di®erent European countries' public bonds rather than to lower long term interest rates. In o±cial
writings, the ECB many times has expressed worries about in°ation and made plans to raise interest
rates but, fortunately, it did not do this.
53 The current state of the ¯nancial markets in the U S.
In the US the measures taken by the central bank to inject liquidity have produced an increase in the
monetary base M1. This increase, however, has not a®ected the supply of credit. Strangely enough
M1, is bigger than broad money aggregates (Keen 2009). The data on commercial and industrial
loans, which are strongly decreasing, con¯rm this point:
Figure 2: Source: Federal Reserve (2010)
The reason is that the demand for credit supply is missing. In the US, the lack of demand may
be explained by the fact that the households are saving more to pay past debts and investment
has not started to grow again after the crisis. Thus, all the liquidity goes to the giant ¯nancial
institutions generated by the disorderly rescues made up during the crisis, which may speculate
again on anything, from the weak European states debts to commodity and raw materials prices.
All the menu of derivatives products that were available before the ¯nancial crisis is still there. Even
if markets have been revitalized there is still no one that warrants liquidity for those markets.
Interest rates are at their historical lows both short term and long term. Stock prices instead have
risen again near to their pre-crisis levels. But if this may bring relief to some ¯nancial institutions'
balance sheets, it does not resolve the problems of all the people who now have to repay a loan which
is higher than the value of their house. The prospects for recovery are thus dim.
The price levels of di®erent assets are showing di®erent tendencies. The producer price levels had
fallen during the ¯rst year of the crisis, thus making de°ation possible. It has been rising, though
slowly, until last March 2010 but now it is falling again because of the falling consumers' con¯dence
and the persistent high unemployment.
The stock price index, instead, shows a very pronounced recovery with respect to the post crisis
period. The home price index has been falling heavily during 2008 while the fall has been mitigated
in 2009-10 by the intervention of the Fed to sustain the mortgages market and by ¯scal discounts
to home purchasers, which now have expired. In the following graph we see the fall in home price
index because of the crisis:
Another e®ort of the administration is to keep very low interest rates at all maturities to help
people who took a variable rate mortgage, to service it. Most mortgages have a ¯xed interest rate
for the ¯rst years and then become variable rate mortgages. For those which have not yet reset to
variable, the lower interest rates may help. The problem is that, if the value of the house falls too
much with respect to the mortgage value, foreclosures and/or strategic defaults are likely to occur.
IMF (2010) forecasts an increase in the rate of strategic defaults in the next years. The evolution
6Figure 3: Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors Statistics.
7Figure 4: Source: Federal Reserve (2010).
8of home prices in the following years is thus decisive. The government has done until now a lot to
sustain the prices of ¯nancial assets but has not introduced any measure to relieve the conditions of
distressed home owners. It is reasonable to expect that they will have to restrain consumption to
pay out their debt. Thus, after years of falling saving ratios, the saving rate is and will be increasing.
The e®ects of rising stock prices with very low interest rates on the balance sheets of ¯nancial
institutions is very di®erent according to the specialization of the same institutions. The big ¯nancial
institutions that have survived the crisis through public money infusions and mergers, now may
continue to do their business under improved conditions. They have posted a gain in last year balance
and this gain comes from trading activity. Even without considering arbitrage and speculation, if
they just charge a fee for trading in assets, which is calculated as a percentage of the value of assets,
the recovery of assets prices obviously causes an increase of their trading revenues. Moreover, their
interest margin has increased rather than decreased. This may be due to the fact that now, thanks
to their bigger size and to the moral hazard speculations induced by the rescues, they are getting
funds at a rate which still lower than that paid before the crisis. Due to their size and to the
implicit government guarantee, they are now perceived as safer than they were before the crisis. On
the contrary, the large number of smaller commercial banks dispersed through the country have a
reduced interest margin due to the very thin di®erence between lending and borrowing rates and
have to cope with increasing non performing loans and perspective recapitalizations (Federal Reserve
2010).
As a conclusion, it can be stated that the main bene¯ciaries of this policy of quantitative easing
have been the big banks, which have increased their trading revenues and the rentiers, the owners
of wealth in the form of ¯nancial assets. If the trend in the relative prices of assets continues in the
future, it will increase inequality as measured by the ratio of stock prices to house prices. The richer
households, whose net wealth is positive and whose wealth has a higher share of ¯nancial assets,
will be favoured in comparison to the poorer households, who have a negative net wealth due to the
mortgage debt (Tropeano, 2010b forthcoming).
4 The current situation situation of the ¯nancial markets in
the Euro area
In Europe also the main stock market indexes have returned again to their pre crisis levels. The
main di®erence with respect the US is that ¯nancial markets are less layered and non bank ¯nancial
institutions are less important as to shares of assets, though there are big di®erences among countries
within Europe. Moreover, in Europe there has not been a bubble in housing prices except in some
countries, such as Ireland, Spain, some Eastern European countries that do not have the Euro as
their currency yet. Private debt as a ratio to GDP is important only in countries like Ireland, Spain,
Portugal but for the remaining ones this is not an emergency situation. This means that the painful
process of saving more, so as to be able to generate revenues to pay past debts should weigh less on
the aggregate demand of the Euro zone. Households, though enjoying low incomes should not worry
about the high debt contracted in the past. In theory this should help the recovery of the Euro
zone, thereby leaving more space for aggregate demand increases. However, this is not the case.
The monetary policy of the ECB, like that pursued by the Federal Reserve, by getting stock prices
high again may have favoured the richer part of families, which have a positive net wealth and own
the biggest shares of ¯nancial assets. The same cannot be said of the rest of population. The most
striking thing is that in Europe many countries have engaged in strong ¯scal contractionary policies,
which aim at reassuring international capital markets on the ability of governments to honour their
debts. These policies have been implemented in di®erent measure by many countries, which are in
di®erent conditions. The result is just to aggravate the consequences of the crisis and to postpone
the recovery. In those countries that have started the ¯scal contraction policy from a longer time,
the fall in aggregate demand and the rise in unemployment is stunning (see the case of Ireland). The
worsening in the public ¯nances of many countries, though not all of them (a notable exception is
Greece), is due to the expenses made to rescue failing ¯nancial institutions, which in the European
accounts weigh directly on the balance sheets of the governments that have intervened. In the US,
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(see Ferguson and Johnson 2009), some of these costs are still on the balance sheet of the central
bank, though improperly. In some of the ¯scal contractions in Europe, the packages include explicit
reductions in nominal salaries of employees, something which reminds us of the reduction in nominal
wages, implemented during the 1929 crisis by the Fascist government in Italy and of its disastrous
consequences.
The recovery of ¯nancial assets' prices is less important in Europe than it is in the United States:
The reasons are the following:
1) the savings propensity out of wealth is higher in Europe than in the United States. So no
signi¯cant e®ect on consumption can reasonably be expected. In Germany the propensity to save
out of wealth has increased in the period before the crisis rather than falling.
2) the weight of pension funds and other institutional investors, which have in their portfolios
stocks and other ¯nancial assets, is quite limited with respect to the US.
3) though in some countries there has been a real estate bubble, there has been no extraction
of rents from the value of the houses on the part of European families, as it has happened in the
US. Thus a fall in the value of houses though impairing the ability of families to repay debt has no
direct consequence on consumption through the wealth e®ect.
The crisis in Europe has simply been a consequence of the globalization of ¯nance and, in partic-
ular, of the global dimension of the inter-bank market. The interconnections between European and
U S banks have survived the ¯nancial crisis. The European banks, to invest the abundant savings
and the many borrowed funds, have purchased huge quantities of ¯nancial assets born and packaged
in the wild and unregulated US markets. The losses they have su®ered because of this very unwise
policy, aimed at increasing the return to shareholders through leverage, have been borne by the state
and now, through taxation and spending cuts, they will be transferred to the citizens.
Since consumption was not dependent on debt, there has not been a reduction in demand due
to the burst of a bubble. The strong fall in output growth is mostly due to the contraction in trade
°ows. In most European countries, given the stagnation of domestic aggregate demand, the most
important source of income growth has been exports. European countries could not avoid the painful
output contractions following the burst of the bubble in the US. Still worse, given that the weakness
of domestic demand was due to low wages, not supplemented by wealth or debt injections, and
high inequality, the measures taken to overcome the ¯nancial crisis risk to perpetuate the existing
situation. People with low wages, unemployed or precariously employed will see their situation
worsened, while the people who already enjoyed capital gains and high salaries will not notice big
changes with respect to the past.
Moreover, given that the interconnections between European and US giant ¯nancial institutions
are still important that the markets for derivatives are still unregulated in the U S, it is quite
probable that any further disturbance or crisis in the U S market will spread itself to Europe in
exactly the same way at it has done in the last three years. Securitization markets are relatively
frozen in the U S but derivatives markets are °ourishing again and are gaining liquidity and depth.
The recent Dodd-Frank Financial Stability Act does not address the problem of systemic instability
within the ¯nancial system. The more conservative attitude towards ¯nancial regulation in Europe
cannot avoid the spreading of disturbances through interconnected markets.
After the ¯nancial crisis, the banking systems in the US and in Europe appear to have increased
their interconnectedness. A recent study by the IMF (see IMF 2010) has calculated that the proba-
bility that a distress in one of the two banking systems spreads itself to the other one has increased
after the crisis with respect to the pre-crisis level (see graph below).
5 Concluding remarks
The monetary policy responses by the Federal Reserve and the ECB to the devastating ¯nancial
crisis of 2007-08 are based on some common elements but they diverge in their general philosophy.
The Federal Reserve, throughout the ¯rst year of the crisis, was attempting to use traditional
liquidity injections while at the same time strongly participating in Paulson's shadow bailout with
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interventions, which, in some cases, even violated existing laws. From March 2008 onwards the Fed
has started the special facilities programmes that have replaced private markets rather than simply
supported them. The balance sheet of the Fed has swollen and in particular it contains more than
one trillion of mortgage backed securities. These interventions have been justi¯ed by the emergency
situation created by the crisis and were underpinned by Bernanke's monetarist faith that in the
end, by pumping into the system in¯nite quantities of money, in°ation will rise and de°ation will be
avoided. The central bank never seemed aware of the structural °aws in the architecture of the US
¯nancial system. Neither did the legislators that have drafted the recent Frank-Dodd Act, which has
been approved by the US Parliament. The strategy of the Fed, according to Bernanke's speeches, is
to continue to keep the short term interest rate close to zero in the future and to go on with asset
purchases that will lower the long term interest rates.
The ECB, after the initial unhappy move of raising the interest rate in the midst of a crisis, has
done more or less the same. It has injected liquidity into the system through usual and unusual tools.
It has also in part purchased middle or long term assets in the markets but its interventions in this
respect have been both quantitatively and qualitatively less important then those made by the Fed.
The ECB has intervened particularly in the market for covered bonds, an asset used by ¯nancial
institutions to ¯nance themselves, and recently in the market for public bonds. The di®erence with
respect to the US is that the European ¯nancial system is less layered than that of the former. The
weight of the non bank ¯nancial institutions on total assets is less pronounced and the problem of
managing a complex and highly interconnected ¯nancial system less urgent. Only in some countries
there has been a real estate bubble but the di®usion of derivatives products in Europe is much lower
than in the U S. The problems linked to derivatives and securitization do not directly concern the
ECB. This notwithstanding, however, given that the interconnectedness between U S and European
banking institutions has increased after the crisis, the danger that any distress in the U S market
will be transmitted to the European ¯nancial system is higher now than in the past. Moreover, while
the philosophy of the Fed is to lower and lower interest rates because this will avoid de°ation and
will help the indebted families to repay their debt, no such philosophy - based on a sort of liquidity
11trap monetarism - lies behind the ECB's action. In Europe short term interest rates are very low
but the ECB has repeatedly warned that they will be raised to avoid an unlikely in°ation. Long
term interest rates are not so low as in the United States, probably because the risk of European
average debts is perceived as higher than that of the U S. No deliberate strategy of lowering long
term interest rates by resorting to unusual tools has been announced by the ECB. It is indeed likely
that because of the increased costs of funding for banks, of the recapitalizations they need and of the
nonperforming loans that will emerge in the future, those rates will be higher than now. A higher
interest margin, however, should favour traditional banking activity. While in the US there is a
commitment by the Central Bank to maintain both short term and long term interest rates low, no
such commitment exists in the Euro area. If the countries that mostly in°uence the decisions of the
ECB, like Germany, will experience a rapid recovery, an increased pressure to raise interest rates is
likely.
Unfortunately, the idea that a restrictive ¯scal policy will induce markets to trust governments
and thus lower the cost of debts and help the recovery is gaining consensus on both sides of the
Atlantic. No attention is being paid to the mounting unemployment. Thus the combination of a
very lax monetary policy and a restrictive ¯scal policy will lead us to a situation where wages and
aggregate demand will be depressed while eventually gains arising from arbitrage and speculation
will °ourish. Many references to the Japanese crisis in the `90s have been made in the current
debate on economic policy. Perhaps it should not be forgotten that one of the by-products of the
quantitative easing policy of the Bank of Japan was the growth of a very pro¯table and long lasting
carry trade.
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